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Co-operation in Health and Safety: A Game Theory
Analysis
SYLVIE NADEAU†

INTRODUCTION
Health and safety managers face complex challenges in today’s production environments. They are confronted with increasingly flexible,
autonomous and polyvalent contexts. Asymmetry of information on the
workplace is widespread because various intervening parties rely on information lacking conformity. Social partners generate and use information which supports or benefits their pursuit of differing goals. Ascertaining and controlling this information can prove both difficult and costly.
When addressing health and safety issues, one intervening partner alters or
changes behavior in response to changes introduced by the other side.1
Strategic behaviors result, based on post-contract opportunism (moral hazard) and alliances with partners who can reasonably be expected to deliver
predictable and effective contributions toward individual goals (adverse
selection). These behaviors arise out of diagnostic problems, difficulty in
determining acceptable risk, asymmetries in the information used in risk
taking decisions on the part of social partners and the operation of health
and safety systems.2
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1. Marcel Simard & Alain Marchand. Workgroups’ Propensity to Comply With Safety Rules: The
Influence of Micro-Macro Organisational Factors, 40 Ergonomics 172, 185 (1997).
2. Bernard Fortin & Paul Lanoie, Effects of Workers' Compensation: A Survey,
< http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/98s-04.pdf > 1-2 (accessed June 23, 2003).
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Many studies show that intervening parties in health and safety are not
economically passive.3 The health and safety system can become a work
substitute.4 Other studies have found a correlation between reduced generosity attributable to unemployment insurance and increases in the mean
time of absenteeism compensated by the Health and Safety Commission of
Quebec (C.S.S.T.: Commission de la santé et de la sécurité au travail du
Québec).5 These studies also found an association between reduced unemployment allowances and a higher incidence of cases based on selective
revelations or voluntary and planned manipulation of information.6 Other
studies have found that injuries posing more difficult diagnosis than
bruises and lacerations, for example, are most often reported on the first
day following a holiday.7 Finally, some studies showed that the health and
safety compensation system of the Health and Safety Commission of Quebec has had an effect on the nature of injuries reported. Increases in the
anticipated compensation generate higher incidence in non-related work
injuries and injuries difficult to diagnose.8
Many experts and managers have favored incentives promoting active
worker participation to thwart such strategic behaviors, but these are difficult to design.9 Others have developed a risk management approach called
participating ergonomics, where the intervention process is advisory, rep-

3. James R. Chelius, The Influence of Workers' Compensation on Safety Incentives, 35 Indus.&
Lab. Rel. Rev. 235, 236 (1982); John D. Worrall & David Appel, The Impact of Workers' Compensation Benefits on Low-back Claims, in Clinical Concepts in Regl. Musculoskeletal Illness 8 (Norton M.
Hadler ed., Grune and Stratton 1987); Alan B. Krueger, Incentive Effects of Workers' Compen. Ins., 41
J. Public Econ. 73, 74 (1990); Marian C. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi, Compen. Mechanisms for Job
Risks: Wages, Workers' Compensation, and Product Liability 228 (Princeton U. Press 1990); Richard
J. Butler, Lost Injury Days: Moral Hazard Differences Between Tort and Workers' Compensation, 63 J.
Risk & Ins. 405, 409 (1996); Harold H. Gardner et al., Disability Benefits When Workers Matter, 2
Mind/Body Med. 138, 146 (1996); Denis Bolduc et al., Incentive Effects of Public Insurance Programs
on the Occurrence and the Composition of Workplace Injuries, < http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/
publication/ 97s-24.pdf > 1 (accessed June 23, 2003); Fortin, supra n. 2, at 1-2.
4. Garder, supra n. 3, at 146; Harold H. Gardner & Richard J. Butler, A Human Capital Perspective
for Cumulative Trauma Disorders: Moral Hazard Effects in Disability Compensation Programs, in
Beyond Biomechanics: Psychosocial Aspects of Musculoskeletal Disorders in Office Work 231-250 (S.
D. Moon & S.L. Sauter eds., Taylor & Francis 1996).
5. Bernard Fortin et al., Is Workers' Compensation Disguised Unemployment Insurance?
<http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/97s-24.pdf> 2 (accessed Apr. 10, 2003); Fortin, supra, n. 2,
at 1-2.
6. Fortin, supra n. 5, at 1-2; Fortin, supra n. 2, at 1-2.
7. Robert S. Smith, Mostly on Monday: Is Workers' Compensation Covering Off-theJob Injuries?,
in Benefits, Costs, and Cycles in Workers' Compensation 115-27 (Philip S. Borba & David Appel eds.,
Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990).
8. Fortin, supra n. 2, at 1-2; Bouldic, supra n. 3, at 1-2.
9. Mario Roy et. al., Équipes Semi-Autonomes de Travail. Recension D'écrits et Inventaire D'expériences Québécoises IRSST, report B-052, 45 Canada (1998).
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resentative of all the social partners and directed toward a consensus.10
Drawbacks to this approach include vulnerability to group dynamics and
conflict over dominance. Training and awareness efforts have been used as
didactic material11 without a clear reduction in injuries such as low back
pain.12 As Goguelin states “[t]o make risk known is in general a good
thing, but insufficient. We must try to understand why the consciousness
of the risk is insufficient and evaluate how one can go further.”13 Government interference through legislation has also been used to restrict injury
coverage. Each of these initiatives aims to encourage the cooperation
needed among managers and workers and has proved successful in this
sense in a number of organizations.
Inevitably, effective and efficient management of health and safety
must spring from an understanding of the dynamics governing the intervening parties. This paper makes use of non-cooperative game theory to
identify conditions fostering cooperation between managers and workers as
social partners in the workplace.
METHODOLOGY: GAME THEORY
Non-cooperative game theory models situations in which individuals
make decisions unilaterally without consulting other intervening parties.
According to Riggs et al., the subject of game theory is situations where “a
competitive environment presupposes intelligent opponents capable of
exerting influence over our outcomes through their choice of action, while

10. Patrick Loisel et al., La clinique des maux de dos. Un modèle de prise en charge, en prévention
de la chronicité, IRSST, report R-140, 37 Canada (1996); Louis Patry et. al., Participatory Ergonomics
and Prevention of Low Back Pain, William S. Marras et al., The Ergonomics of Manual Work, 523-526
(William S. Marras et al. eds., Taylor & Francis 1993); Ilkka Kuorinka et al., Participation in Workplace Design With Reference to Low Back Pain: A Case for the Improvement of the Police Patrol Car,
37 Ergonomics 1131, 1133 (1994); Veronique De Keyser, La démarche participative en sécurité, 33
Bulletin de Psychologie 479, 489 (1980).
11. Ken L. Donajkowski, Back Injury: Causes, Prevention, Treatment Prof. Safety, September, 2126 (1993).
12. John D. Benson, Control of Low Back Pain: Using Ergonomic Task Redesign Techniques, 32
Prof. Safety 21, 22 (1987); Steven A. Lavender & Ron Kenyeri, Lifting Belts: A Psychophysical Analysis, 38 Ergonomics 1723, 1723 (1995); Stover Snook et al., The Design of Manual Handling Tasks, 21
Ergonomics 963, 1197 (1978); Peter Mandell et al., Low Back Pain 219 (Slack Inc. 1989); Ilkka
Kuorinka et al., Manual Handling in Warehouses: The Illusion of Correct Working Postures, 37
Ergonomics 655, 660 (1994); Monique Lortie et al., Analyse des Accidents Associés au Travail de
Mmanutentionnaires sur les Quais dans le Secteur Transport, 59 Le Travail Humain 180, 187 (1996).
13. Pierre Goguelin, Risque et Prise de Risque: Les Concepts, in La Prise de Risques dans le Travail 29 ( Pierre Goguelin & Xavier Cuny eds. 2001).
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concurrently we choose a course of action that maximizes our returns with
respect to the opponents’ anticipated activities.”14
Much of the conceptual framework draws on work by mathematicians
Von Newman and Nash in the 1940`s and early 1950`s. On one hand, this
model demonstrates that effective individual strategies or behaviors do not
necessarily create a situation that is best for all. On the other hand, given
certain conditions, it confirms that cooperation can exist without formal
agreement among the intervening parties.
Game theory has been used to understand and organize both human
and animal activity. As a decision theory, it helps to explain possible strategic behaviors of individuals without defining the final tactics. Many
textbooks cover the topic and its application in varying fields.15
MODEL: SIMULTANEOUS GAME WITH PERFECT AND INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION

Workers and management seek to achieve their respective goals by
choosing preferred actions based on inferences about steps that will be
taken by the other party. Expectations concerning such actions are based
on these hypotheses:
• Each

player (decision-maker) possesses information on the rules and
conditions of the game (social situation);
• Players are rational (“he makes decisions consistently in pursuit of
his own objectives”);16
• Players seek to maximize the anticipated value of their own payoffs,
that can be described by an utility function;
• Players are intelligent (he “knows everything that we know about the
game and he can make any inferences about the situation”).17
Since Milgrom and Roberts18 have shown that theories based on perfect
rationality and adaptability are successful in generating predictions about
14. James L. Riggs et al., Engineering Economics 564 (McGraw Hill 1986).
15. See Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization (MIT Press 1988); Drew Fudenberg &
Jean Tirole, Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview
Handbook of Industrial Organization vol. 1 (Elsevier Science Publishers 1989); David Kreps, Game
Theory and Economic Modelling (Clarendon Press England 1990); Avinash K. Dixit & Barry J. Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life (W.W.
Norton & Co. 1991); Roger B. Myerson, Game Theory Analysis of Conflict 1-7 (Harvard U. Press
1991).
16. Myerson, supra n. 15, at 1-7.
17. Myerson, supra n. 15, at 1-7.
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organizations and their practices, the rationality hypothesis is appropriate,
even essential, to the analysis of technical situations.
However, the assumption that all individuals are perfectly rational and
intelligent may never be satisfied in any real-life situations as claimed by
Myerson.19 Conversely, a prevention program based on irrational behaviors will lead most likely to an ineffective situation.
In this problem, management’s and workers’ motivations as well as the
variables modulating their choice of actions are well known. Management
allocates resources in health and safety owing to legal obligation, as the
result of an economic decision or awareness of problems.20 Workers will
engage in health and safety consistent with their personal objectives and
their perception of the risks present in their environment.21 Not to be overlooked, however, are asymmetries of information concerning the health of
workers and the risk taking decisions made by social partners. The model
must also deal with diagnostic uncertainties, the difficulty in assessing
risks present in the workplace and determining what level of risk is tolerable. Workers and managers cannot know with preciseness and certainty
the value each other has assigned to the different variables modulating
their choice of actions, nor the commitment the other makes to health and
safety. In game theory, this type of interaction can be modeled by games
with incomplete and imperfect information.22 In this paper, we use a game
with perfect information (the players know the history of the decisions
taken in the past). It is a reasonable hypothesis so long as the tactical factors are not broached. Pervasive asymmetries surrounding information
relative to the effort directed at health and safety justify use of a simultaneous, rather than a Bayesian, game.

18. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management Ch. 1-7 (Prentice
Hall 1997).
19. Myerson, supra n. 15, at 1-7.
20. Sylvie Nadeau, Outil d'analyse Multifactorielle Pour la Prévention des Maux de Dos 116, 118,
147 (unpublished Ph.D thesis, École Polytechnique de Montréal, Département de Mathématiques et de
Génie Industriel 2001) (on file at Natl. Lib. Canada).
21. Id.
22. Myerson, supra n. 15, at 1-7 (“at the first point in time when the players can begin to plan their
moves in the game, some players already have private information about the game that other players do
not know”).
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In this paper, we use the strategic (or normal) form to represent the
game. Therefore,
Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N, (ui)i∈N)
where
N is the set of players in the game
i is the player
Ci is the set of strategies available to player i
ui is the expected utility payoff that player i would get in this game
A strategy profile (C) is a combination of strategies that the players
might choose
In our problem,

C = Χi∈N Ci

N = 1, 2 = workers, managers
C1 = C2 = improve efforts in health and safety, maintain efforts in
health and safety as is
Four outcomes are possible:
C = (a1=improve, a2=improve), (improve, maintain), (maintain, maintain), (maintain, improve)
Efforts in health and safety can be considered laborious, costly and not
necessarily maximizing the individual utility payoff. There may be situations in which any small private effort in improving health and safety
yields immediate and tremendous returns. But the optimization of efficiency of health and safety measures depends on the synergy of actions
taken by the social partners. Consequently:
• If workers and managers both improve their efforts in health and
safety, their expected individual utility payoff will incur lower cost.
• If both maintain their efforts in health and safety, expected individual utility payoff will prove costly.
• If one partner improves its efforts in health and safety, which is a
very costly individual decision, the other will benefit from these efforts. More precisely, if a health and safety program goes offcourse, or if workers claim it is ineffective, workers may benefit
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from these efforts but they are very costly to management. If workers’ efforts go unrecognized or are not sustained by the firm, however, the individual payoff is costly to workers while managers
benefit (through lower their insurance costs, for example). The following utilities emerge:
u1 (improve, improve) = u2 (improve, improve) = less costly situation
u1 (improve, maintain) = u2 (maintain, improve) = very costly situation
u1 (maintain, improve) = u2 (improve, maintain) = beneficial situation
u1 (maintain, maintain) = u2 (maintain, maintain) = costly situation
This game may be represented in a tabular form, as represented in Table 1:
Table 1
Game in Tabular Form
MANAGERS
Improve
Maintain
Improve (less costly, less costly) (very costly,
benefic.)
WORKERS
Maintain (benefic., very costly)
(costly, costly)

DISCUSSION: EQUILIBRIUM OF THE GAME
We need to determine where the game leads the partners in terms of
the possible outcomes. In this game, we can identify a Nash equilibrium (a
combination of strategies that neither player will regret after assessing the
choices made by other players), precisely:
ui(c*i, c*-i) ≥ ui (ci, c-*i), ∀ci ∈Ci
This strategy seeks to maintain without change efforts in health and
safety. We can also identify a Pareto efficiency equilibrium (the outcome
of a game is Pareto efficient if the outcome of a player cannot be improved
without diminishing the outcome of others):
the result c^ dominates the result c if:

ui (c^) ≥ ui (c), ∀i and
∃ j, uj (c^) > uj (c)
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In our game, (improve, improve) is a Pareto efficiency equilibrium.
The health and safety game is similar to the Prisoners’ Dilemma.23
The equilibriums found provide a clear indication of how the intervening
parties will interact in the real world. In this game, rationally, the social
partners ought to maintain the status quo in terms of efforts in health and
safety (Nash equilibrium). They ought to avoid the moderate decision, in
terms of expected individual payoff, which is to improve efforts in health
and safety (Pareto efficiency equilibrium). Therefore, the rational individual strategies will lead to an outcome that is bad for all social partners. In
this type of problem, we can command effective and efficient co-operation
between workers and managers so long as the time span of the game is
unknown. This has been demonstrated using genetic algorithms by Axelrod24 and others.25
Analysis of interactions among workers and managers in health and
safety, using game theory, brings us to conclude that if cooperation can be
established, it has good chances for survival. There are two important factors in establishing such cooperation:
1. Acting on the costs and benefits of initiatives in health and safety.
Wilde,26 in his homeostasis theory, points us in this direction:
•

•

•

•

One should reduce the benefits of taking health and safety risks,
which may be done by the use of appropriate legislation or intrafirm politics;
One should reduce the cost of making efforts to improve health and
safety, which may be done by modifying the insurance fees or by
promoting the use of safety groups;
One should increase the benefits making efforts to improve health
and safety, which is the object of different incentive measures and
may be done by the use of appropriate training programs and certifications;
One should increase the cost of taking risks in health and safety,
which is currently done by legislation.

23. R. Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions Ch. 5 (Wiley 1957).
24. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation Ch. 7 (Basic Books 1984).
25. Fudenberg, supra n. 15.
26. Gerald J. S. Wilde, Beyond the Concept of Risk Homeostasis: Suggestions for Research and
Application Towards the Prevention of Accidents and Lifestyle-Related Disease, 18 Accident Analysis
and Prevention 377, 401 (1986).
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2. Changing the rules and conditions of interactions by establishing
implicit and explicit contracts in health and safety prevention. In previous
results,27 we have proposed an ergonomics intervention approach leading
to the establishment of common and objective information on the health
and safety risk factors. Making explicit contracts and accepting this information binds the social partners and limits the strategic behaviors, increasing the probability of success of the intervention in health and safety. This
implicit contract is one of the conditions under which co-operation will
take place without any legal intervention in either the infinite or the indefinite versions of the game.
Our analysis indicates that a range of measures may be employed to
encourage and facilitate co-operation which might not occur in their absence.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have demonstrated that incompatibility exists in the
aims and strategies of the social partners with respect to health and safety.
This situation can prove inefficient or unproductive for all. Management
of health and safety needs to consider the strategic behaviors practiced by
intervening parties to introduce measures that are effective as well as efficient. Both implicit and explicit contracts must be constructed to address
dominant behavior and to facilitate co-operation on health and safety issues.

27. Nadeau, supra n. 20, at 116, 118, 147.

